The Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals
When the Cold War ended in 1989, there were six permanent international courts plus the non-compulsory dispute settlement system of the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (GATT) . Th e European Court of Justice (ECJ) off ered the model of an active and eff ective international court. Th e other six international legal mechanisms did not inspire much enthusiasm or attention from litigants or observers. Today, however, there are at least two dozen permanent international courts (ICs) that have collectively issued over 37,000 binding legal judgments, more than 90 percent of which were issued since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Contemporary ICs attract much more attention from litigants, journalists, activists, governments, scholars, and critics. Irrelevant institutions are mostly ignored. So, although it might seem counter-intuitive to say, the calls for greater action coupled with the complaints about how ICs are infringing on national political autonomy are actually signs that today's international courts are of growing political importance.
Th e greater infl uence of ICs today is not simply a matter of numbers. Today's ICs are fundamentally diff erent from their historical predecessors. Mary Ellen O'Connell and Lenore VanderZee's contribution to this handbook explains how the fi rst ICs were primarily voluntary dispute settlement bodies, institutions litigants could use if they wanted a legal resolution to a disagreement. Th e big shift was towards ICs with compulsory jurisdiction, a change that started during the Cold War and has since accelerated. Today's ICs, what I call "new-style ICs, " have compulsory jurisdiction and they allow non-state actors to initiate litigation. ICs' compulsory jurisdiction makes it harder for defendant governments to block inconvenient cases from proceeding. Access for non-state actors to initiate litigation increases the likelihood that issues people care about can be adjudicated by an international court. Today's ICs have also been delegated a broader range of judicial roles. ICs have been constituted to serve as dispute settlers, administrative review bodies, enforcers, and constitutional review bodies.
1 Today, the lion's share of all international legal rulings are issued in cases initiated by supranational commissions and prosecutors or private litigants with the plaintiff seeking to have state or international organization actions reviewed and international legal rules enforced.
Section 1 of this chapter provides an empirical overview of the multiplication of international courts since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and explains how most ICs today emulate the European model of new-style ICs and embedded law enforcement, raising a question of why regions are embracing European-style ICs. Section 2 summarizes the external and internal forces promoting the multiplication of international courts and examines three case studies that help us see how external and internal forces contribute to the multiplication of ICs and the copying of European design models. Section 3 concludes.
The Multiplication of International Courts Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall
By the end of 2011, there were nearly two dozen operational permanent international courts-courts with appointed or elected judges that were being invoked by litigants to render binding legal rulings in cases where states or international institutions were the defendants. Four of these legal bodies were global in reach-the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO AB), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Th e rest were regional bodies located in Africa (9), Europe (6), and Latin America (5). Asia had a proposed dispute settlement system that includes a permanent appellate body. Th ese bodies have jurisdiction to hear cases involving economic disputes (17), human rights issues (4), and war crimes (3 + hybrid courts). A number of these bodies also have a general jurisdiction that allows them to adjudicate any case state litigants choose to bring. Figure 4 .1 shows the proliferation of operational courts considered in this analysis, including in parentheses the year the courts were created. Th e creation of three of the most active and important international courts in the world today and what became an informal dispute settlement system of the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade are linked to the aft ermath of World War II. Th ree more permanent ICs were created during the Cold War. Th e remaining ICs were created following the end of the Cold War. A number of the above-mentioned legal bodies were also reformed in the post-Cold War period. Most of these reforms were intended to increase the reach and eff ectiveness of international courts by removing the requirement that states consent to litigation, by widening access to initiate adjudication, and by extending subject matter jurisdiction. Both pre-existing and new international legal bodies were also more active in the post-Cold War period.
2 Whereas ICs had collectively 
Multiplication through emulation
We might consider it plagiarism or a violation of intellectual property if individuals assiduously copied the ideas of others, but in the legal realm the name for the phenomenon is "legal transplants. " As lawyers well know, there are tremendous similarities in national constitutions and bodies of law, and in fact most national legal systems are based on a European model, and then referred to as "legal families. "
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It should thus come as no surprise that the multiplication of ICs involves copying pre-existing models. Given that Europe's ICs are known for being activist and sovereignty compromising, the extent to which European models have also infl uenced international judicial design is, however, surprising. International economic courts tend to follow one of two basic models. Th e GATT/WTO model has compulsory jurisdiction and only states can initiate non-compliance suits. Th is design ensures that only the disputes governments care about are adjudicated. Regional systems that adopt the GATT/WTO model oft en also adopt its panel system of dispute settlement, which allows governments to fi rst use consultation and then try a more arbitral style of dispute adjudication, before any appeal to a more legalized appellate body. Th e other basic template is the ECJ model, which has a supranational commission that monitors state compliance and brings non-compliance cases to the supranational court; a preliminary ruling mechanism that allows private litigants to raise cases in national courts, which can then be referred to the supranational court; and systems of administrative and constitutional review that allow states, community institutions, and private litigants to challenge community acts in front of the supranational court.
4 Figure 4 .2 classifi es ICs by which model they copy. I have also included NAFTA and ICSID, even though these are ad hoc systems that lack permanent appellate bodies. Elsewhere, I explore meaningful variations in these basic designs. International criminal tribunals build on the basic design of the Nuremburg trials. Criminal tribunals have compulsory jurisdiction, and an international prosecutor selects which cases to pursue. Modern international criminal tribunals improve on the Nuremburg model in that all parties to the confl ict can, in theory, be prosecuted; the international prosecutorial offi ce and tribunals include a broader representation of states and there is an appeals mechanism.
ICs with human rights jurisdictions follow one of two models, both of which are associated with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Th e original ECtHR relied on states to consent to the court's compulsory jurisdiction and to allow private actors to bring complaints to the commission. Governments could consent to the court's jurisdiction for short periods of time (e.g., three to fi ve years), and withdraw their consent if they were unhappy with court rulings. Th e original ECtHR also had a supranational commission that vetted human rights complaints and served as a gatekeeper to the court. Th is is the model copied by the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR), and it has contributed to the dearth of cases reaching that court. It is also the model copied by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), albeit with certain important diff erences.
6 Th e post-Protocol 11 ECtHR has compulsory jurisdiction and direct private access. Th is revised model has been copied by the Court of Justice of the ECOWAS. Figure 4 .3 shows the different design templates used for international human rights and criminal tribunals.
Th ere are of course important diff erences across human rights, mass atrocities and economic courts: human rights courts adjudicate state violations aff ecting private individuals; mass atrocities bodies hold individuals accountable for crimes they have committed; and international economic bodies adjudicate state and international institutional violations of international law. Notwithstanding these critical diff erences, ICs that borrow from European models share essential features. All European-style adjudicative systems have international rules embedded into national systems. Th ese "international" legal rules are more than statutes that ratify treaties, yet can be overridden by subsequent national legislation. Domestically embedded international criminal, human rights, and regulatory law are part of the fabric of the domestic legal order; it is domestic law that, although perhaps formally distinct, is intrinsically connected to international legal obligations. Also, all of these systems include institutional mechanisms (e.g., appellate review, preliminary ruling mechanisms, complementarity principles) that facilitate dialogue between national and supranational legal interpreters, so that interpretation and enforcement of international legal rules becomes an interactive, if not collaborative, enterprise undertaken by domestic and international judges applying what are basically Th is fi gure is based on Alter, note 1, fi gure 3.5. Th is dominance of the European model is somewhat ironic. European governments did not set out to create the supranational judicial institutions that they have today. By all accounts, legal practice, rather than state intention, led to the European legal model that is so widely copied.
8 Moreover, it is fair to say that European political elites remain ambivalent about the encroachments of European law and supranational legal authority in the domestic realm. Despite Europe's ambivalence about its model, the European model diff uses (and one might note that this continued voiced ambivalence is belied by repeated decisions to improve the functioning of Europe's legal institutions.)
Th ere is little evidence that European leaders pressure others to accept their model. Instead, European legal models have drawn their own adherents. In the 1960s, a number of regions copied Europe's approach to regional economic integration, omitting, however, the Economic Community's legal mechanisms. Most of these regional integration eff orts were seen as failures. While observers did not attribute the failure to a lack of a supranational legal structures, participants in these endeavors could not help but notice that the European Economic Community's supranational court-the ECJ-was proving useful in addressing legal issues associated with regional integration. When regional integration returned as a policy objective in the 1980s and 1990s, integration architects paid greater attention to the legal problems presented by regional integration. Legal advocates drew lessons, proposing international legal systems that borrowed from Europe. It took a while to convince governments to embrace international judicial oversight, but eventually the European approach to international law spread.
External Forces Contributing to the Multiplication of International Courts
Institutions get built by people-political entrepreneurs who recognize and seize political opportunities for change, individuals who draft statutes, advocacy movements that put pressure on governments, and governmental actors that decide on the possibilities advocates put in front of them. A full account of the multiplication of international courts would, of course, consider who these actors are and how European ideas diffused. With a few exceptions, however, we lack negotiating histories that can tell us why local actors looked to European models. 9 I focus instead on how external forces generated the opportunities that local advocates seized upon as they pushed for adding international courts. My argument is that these external forces created a permissive environment which proponents could seize upon to advocate the creation of an IC, borrowing European models.
Undoubtedly, a large systemic force indirectly at play was the end of the Cold War. In Europe, the end of the Cold War meant that political bargains designed to keep Communist parties out of power could be reassessed. Political coalitions shift ed, and judges and other societal groups felt freer to question the old status quo. Th e end of the Cold War led to the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the enlarging of the European Union and the Council of Europe to include former Soviet bloc states. Th is pending enlargement, and the creation of a common currency in Europe, became an impetus to reform Europe's existing legal infrastructure before enlargement, when negotiating change would be relatively easier. Th e conclusion of the Cold War also led to war in the Balkans, which brought the issue of international adjudication of war crimes back to the fore. Outside Europe, the Cold War's close had a diff erent eff ect. With the conclusion of the Cold War came the discrediting of Marxism and Socialism, the cessation of Soviet economic subsidies and the ascendance of neoliberal economic thought in international institutions and the American and European foreign policy elite. Henceforth, any state that wanted help from foreign investors, the International Monetary Fund, or the World Bank needed to show that they were undertaking economic and political reform. Th e 1990s were the high point of what was known as the "Washington Consensus. "
10 American and European leaders were convinced that the superior capitalist economic model had defeated communism. Enamored by the compelling social science fi nding that democracies do not fi ght wars, 11 international institutions became conveyer belts of liberal economic policies, human rights, and democratization.
12 Th e worldwide conjunctural moment of the end of the Cold War created the opportunity for advocates to press for adding ICs. European models became benchmarks that off ered potential solutions and lessons. If the problem was that (1) people distrusted governments' empty promises of the past, then the solution was to self-bind to independent external institutions that were more likely to be trusted. If the problem was that regional economic rules were not implemented or they were ignored, then advocates suggested a solution of making community regulations directly applicable and supreme to national laws, and empowering private litigants to bring violations of the rules to court. If the problem was that war criminals escaped prosecution and created an environment of local intimidation, then the solution was to create international adjudicative mechanisms that could provide assurance that adjudication might be fair and eff ective. Advocates might need to adapt European models to address concerns of member governments, but they could then wait for another permissive moment when governments might want the system to work better. When new opportunities arose, advocates could once again borrow from Europe and suggest reforms that would bring the legal system closer to the European model. Th e critical juncture of the end of the Cold War, and with it the search for resources and solutions, created a permissive environment and perhaps even an impetus for change. But the reason governments were more open to agreeing to sovereignty-compromising international judicial solutions was that the world had changed, and so had their options. Th ree systemic changes-all arguably aff ected by the end of the Cold War-fundamentally changed the choices governments faced. Th e following overly brief discussions are expanded elsewhere.
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Th e fi rst major change was the expansion of the WTO from just over 100 countries when the Cold War ended to 157 members as of this writing. During the Cold War, governments had to pick sides in the confl ict. Members of GATT enjoyed preferential access to American and European markets and a seat at the negotiating table. But to join GATT signaled that a government was picking the Western capitalist side, a decision that brought with it the distrust and displeasure of major communist powers and perhaps even a loss of economic, political, and military support. Th e collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the embrace of market reforms by China, basically eliminated the political costs of joining GATT. As it became clear that many states would want to join GATT, the goal of the Uruguay round of negotiations shift ed to undertaking major reform in advance of enlargement. American and European governments put together a "single undertaking" that would be the price of admission to the WTO's "most favored nation" market access status. Th e new WTO would be a member association, with all members agreeing to abide by a package of WTO free trade rules. To be a member meant that neither Europe nor the United States could revoke your "most favored nation" market access privilege.
States joined GATT and the WTO to gain preferential access to major economic markets and to show their commitment to neoliberal economic ideas, and thereby 13 Moreover, since the WTO allows for regional economic communities to grant preferential market access to members, regional economic integration became more attractive in its own right. Second, WTO member states were already committed to compulsory adjudication of economic disputes. By 1994, WTO members faced the choice of suing each other in the WTO system or creating regional compulsory enforcement mechanisms as a complement to the WTO system. Regional ICs off ered the advantage of judges from the region applying rules adapted by the region's member states. Th e second major change involved the expansion of extraterritorial enforcement of human rights and international humanitarian law. With war crimes on the rise in the 1990s and pictures of mass atrocities telecast around the world, national courts in Belgium and the United Kingdom became more willing to invoke universal jurisdiction and to limit claims of foreign sovereignty immunity. Th e prospect of adjudicating human rights violations in Europe, America, and elsewhere meant that the choice facing governments changed. Governments could create their own review bodies to adjudicate major human rights violations, or they could let foreign bodies adjudicate the cases. According to Kathryn Sikkink, this choice led Latin American courts to reverse grants of amnesty so as to prosecute human rights violations themselves.
14 Foreign trials also shored up the position of those who advocated improving national and regional mechanisms to deal with human rights violations. Creating local remedies at the national and regional level could decrease assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by creating a viable alternative to foreign trials.
Th e third global force for change was the United Nations response to war in Yugoslavia. Evidence of mass atrocities in Yugoslavia had led the UN Security Council to use its Chapter VII powers to create an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes committed in Yugoslavian wars and the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda. Inspired by these political advances, human rights activists advocated for a global model. Surely, a global international criminal court made more sense than multiple ad hoc international tribunals. Political mobilization from the General Assembly and a group of "like-minded" states led to the new International Criminal Court (the ICC, which started operating in 2002 aft er 60 countries had ratifi ed the Rome Statute), and a host of ad hoc hybrid systems to deal with crimes that were committed before and outside the framework of the new ICC (e.g., abuses in Sierra Leone, East Cambodia, and Lebanon). 15 Th is reality has changed the situation of governments. Leaders who are accused of mass atrocities might hope that pressure by powerful allies will keep the Security Council from referring the case to the ICC, but ratifi cation of the Rome Statute has led many countries to enact domestic legislation that authorizes the prosecution of war crimes. Activists can continually pressure governments to bring leaders to court. Maybe the ICC will end up hearing the case, but perhaps equally as likely is that courts in other countries or in other regional systems will one day end up prosecuting the case-as is currently happening with Chad's former leader Hissene Habré.
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As a result of these systemic changes, governments around the world faced the very real prospect that absent local international adjudicative mechanisms, international and national institutions dominated by Americans and Europeans would fi ll in. WTO membership changed the default choice of governments, making regional courts attractive because regional courts are closer to home and staff ed by representatives of the regional organizations' member states. Local adjudication is preferable to human rights and mass atrocities trials in national or international institutions dominated by Western powers. Th is changing reality has made regional adjudicative solutions newly attractive. 
External pressures combine with internal forces: three decisions to add international courts

Creating the Andean Tribunal of Justice
From the Andean Pact's inception, governments believed that they possessed the authority to implement the Cartagena Agreement-the Andean Pact's founding charter-and Andean secondary legislation ( Decisiones ) via presidential decrees. Th is legislative route had the advantage of avoiding national parliaments, in which fractious political parties might attempt to block or revise implementing legislation. But the approach also engendered opposition from business elites who disliked the Andean Pact's import-substitution policies. Opponents raised legal suits in national courts invoking the failure to submit the treaty to national parliaments as they challenged the legal validity of the presidential decrees. National legal challenges to Andean rules in the 1960s and early 1970s ultimately failed. But the manner in which domestic actors responded to these challenges, especially in Colombia, suggested that Andean Decisiones would not be given domestic eff ect. Th e creation of an Andean Tribunal of Justice, and with it the declaration of the direct eff ect and supremacy of Andean rules, provided a way to avoid national judicial invalidation of Andean rules. When Andean offi cials discussed the creation of a supranational court, several potential models were available for their consideration. Th e offi cials could have emulated an early regional tribunal, the Central American Court of Justice, which heard ten cases between 1907 and 1917 before its founding treaty expired. Or they could have embraced the GATT dispute settlement system, although emulating GATT would not have established the direct eff ect of Andean Decisions nor created a mechanism for supranational judicial review of Andean institutions and their decisions. Without such review, national courts might challenge the authority of community law or interpret Andean rules in inconsistent ways. A third alternative-the ECJ model-was the most obvious fi t given the preexisting similarities between other Andean and European institutions. Th e selection of the ECJ model was virtually guaranteed when the Junta asked the Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL) to evaluate the best model for the Andean Pact. Th e INTAL network recommended bundling the creation of an ECJ-style tribunal with foundational ECJ doctrines establishing the direct eff ect and supremacy of community law in national legal orders. Th ese suggestions came in a meeting in June 1972, leading to draft statute that member states discussed in November, and a formal proposal that went to the legislative body of member states in December of that year. Th e proposal focused on two key requirements: the doctrines of supremacy and direct eff ect, and a supranational mechanism to review the legality of community acts. Copying the ECJ's preliminary reference procedure achieved both of these goals. Th e meeting endorsed the creation of an Andean judicial body to review Andean rules and to ensure their uniform interpretation by national judges, and to "reduce unnecessary and sometimes disproportionate political tensions" with those judges-an implicit reference to Colombian Supreme Court rulings that had raised questions about the legal eff ect of Andean secondary legislation in Colombia.
Th is proposal then languished for a number of years. Th e Andean Pact's difficulties in the 1970s underscored that something fundamental needed to change if the member states were to move the integration process forward. Yet even during this troubled period, the EC continued to serve as a model for Andean integration. Europe, too, faced signifi cant challenges to integration in the 1970s. In response, it adopted several institutional innovations. In 1970, the EC launched the European Political Cooperation initiative to coordinate member states' foreign policies, and, in 1974, it formalized the system of Councils of Heads of States to adopt major decisions related to integration. In 1979, the EC replaced a regional legislative body comprised of national parliamentarians with a system of direct elections to a new European Parliament.
When integration advocates later revived the Andean integration project, they tracked these developments. Th e re-launch of the Andean integration project provided the impetus for creating the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ). In 1979, the member states agreed to create an Andean Parliament and a Council of Foreign Ministers. And, in the same year, they fi nally adopted the Treaty Establishing the Tribunal of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, accepting nearly in toto the text draft ed by INTAL in 1972, which the Junta had incorporated into its 1975 recommendation. 20 By 1979, member states had adopted the required texts and, by 1984, the ATJ began operation. Th e ATJ was modeled on the ECJ, but with certain adjustments designed to protect national sovereignty. Private actors could raise cases in national courts, but the Andean Secretariat only considered noncompliance complaints raised by member states. Since Andean governments wanted to avoid legal suits, the system sat empty for a number of years. Th e fi rst case to arise, in 1987, involved a private litigant trying to get his challenge to a Colombian tariff adjudicated by the ATJ. Th e court refused the case, since private actors lacked standing to raise noncompliance suits; the judges instead instructed the litigant to pursue the issue in the national court. References from national courts trickled in thereaft er, but the system remained barely used in its fi rst decade of operation.
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Th e Andean legal system became activated when Andean member states overhauled their existing intellectual property rules in anticipation of member countries joining the WTO. Th e changes adopted made Andean rules compatible with the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), and these changes in turn unleashed demand for local trademarks and patents. Regional intellectual property law became the governing rules. As applications for patents and trademarks increased, so too did national court references for preliminary ruling decisions. 22 Th is litigation has made the ATJ the third most active IC, with over 2,000 rulings to date. But as we explain elsewhere, active does not mean activist. Th e ATJ's law-making style diff ers from its transplanted parent in important ways. 
Creating a legal system for the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa (OHADA)
Th e Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), formed in 1993, creates unifi ed business codes for African countries. Its members are predominately francophone African countries, all of which had anachronistic business rules left over from French colonialism and adapted in a hodgepodge fashion so that few lawyers or judges even knew what governing law applied. Th e result, everyone seemed to agree, was legal uncertainty that was worrisome to potential investors.
24 Th e solution that ended up being adopted borrowed heavily from Europe, although the OHADA court is not a direct transplant. Rather, member states borrowed the idea of having directly applicable supranational rules, the interpretation of which would be overseen by a regional court.
Th e impetus to create OHADA came both internally and externally. Foreign investment in the region fell in the 1980s due to political instability and the reorientation of fi nancial supports in the post-Cold War era. Political leaders wanted more foreign investment, and they became convinced that legal and juridical insecurity 21 Alter, Helfer and Saldias, note 9, at 725. made investing in their markets less desirable. Adopting a common commercial code off ered many advantages. 25 By having the same set of rules across countries, foreign investors could save on the legal expertise needed for each national system. OHADA Uniform Acts were also adapted specifi cally for the needs of developing countries, so that they became more attractive than competing rulesexisting French, American, or EU business law. 26 Member states may not amend the Uniform Acts, and the Acts are widely available on the internet and in source books, providing legal stability and certainty. Th e promulgation of ten detailed multilaterally-craft ed Uniform Acts has activated the OHADA system. OHADA's legal system was also one of OHADA's chief attractions. Foreign lawyers have little faith in Africa's national legal systems, where judges are perceived to be ill-informed and oft en corrupt. International dispute resolution is an alternative, but it is expensive because cases are litigated outside the region. OHADA created its own arbitration system that is managed by the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA). Th is arbitration system is yet to take root, in part because most contract agreements do not yet specify OHADA as the arbitral venue. But the CCJA has become activated as a body that provides an international review of national judicial rulings involving OHADA law.
Externally, the OHADA system was strongly supported by the French government with the encouragement of the Conseil Français des Investisseurs en Afrique . Th e French government was interested in any solution that might help stabilize the Franc zone, because regional instability could generate currency pressures felt in France. A 1991 meeting of African fi nance ministers from African Franc countries, held in France, led to the commissioning of a study on the feasibility of creating regional business law.
27 Th e French Foreign Ministry reached out to Kéba Mbaye, a former Senegalese Supreme Court judge and President of the ICJ, who, in the 1960s, had advocated legal harmonization among newly independent states. Th e French Foreign Ministry underwrote and provided technical support for Mbaye's eff orts, which led to the founding of OHADA. 28 France, other EU and non-EU countries, and other international institutions provided fi nancial support to pay for OHADA. While member states now also provide support for the system, it is safe to say that foreign support has been instrumental to the functioning of OHADA. Also the French Foreign Ministry, to this day, has at least one attaché at the OHADA secretariat.
When it appeared that the soon-to-be-implemented OHADA Uniform Acts had been largely forgotten, French patrons, with the support of funding from various 25 See Mouloul, note 24, at 10-11. 26 Mouloul, note 24, at 10-11; CM Dickerson, "Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA Calls the Tune" (2005) international institutions, created a non-governmental organization to promote awareness of OHADA and its laws. Th e Association for the Unifi cation of African Law plays an analogous role to Eurolaw associations, which in Europe helped to promote European Community law within national systems in the 1960s. 29 Th e Association helps with training sessions and maintains a website-OHADA. com-that makes available OHADA Uniform Acts and CCJA and national court rulings applying OHADA law. Th e French journal Juriscope , with the support of Coopération Français , publish commentary and compendiums of Uniform Acts and community case law, which they help to distribute throughout the region. Th is is important because in many African countries journals publishing laws and legal rulings are irregularly maintained and hard to access. Members of the Association's network regularly visit national courts to collect rulings that pertain to OHADA. Th e rulings are transcribed and published online. While the collection of national legal rulings on OHADA.com is surely incomplete, the website supplies what may be the only publicly available searchable source for case law in OHADA member states.
30 I know of no conversation where participants actively discussed borrowing from Europe, although such a conversation may well have occurred. But France was funding and participating in the conversations, and it may well have seemed natural that aspects of Europe's supranational system could help address the challenges OHADA countries faced. Th ere was also probably no conversation about following the jurist advocacy strategy that took place in Europe. Indeed, the European strategy was itself barely a strategy-it was mostly an adaptation of the traditional role of legal advocates coming together to discuss important developing legal issues.
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Th e combination of the Uniform Acts and international review of national court rulings makes the OHADA system a "European style" IC. Why not create, however, a supranational court modeled on the ECJ with commission enforcement and a preliminary ruling mechanism? One reason perhaps is that OHADA is intentionally diff erent from a common market. If OHADA had a larger political objective, like establishing a monetary union or good governance norms, it would be in direct competition with the West and Central African Economic and Monetary Unions, which promote economic integration among former French colonies. 32 Moreover, OHADA aspires to provide a set of business laws that any country can adopt. OHADA is also primarily designed for business contracts, thus it does not need to replicate the inter-state dispute resolution mechanisms of the WTO or the supranational enforcement mechanism of the EU. Th e 2008 Québec reforms have brought OHADA institutions closer in form to the EU, 33 but the format for creating Uniform Acts in OHADA remains multilateral more than supranational. Th ere is thus no reason to create administrative and constitutional review roles as checks on supranational authority.
Th e existence of detailed OHADA law and mobilized litigants who wanted OHADA rules respected explain why the OHADA court has become the fourth most active permanent IC today, with 569 rulings by the end of 2011. But while OHADA law is formally speaking the supreme business law of the land, and CCJA decisions the highest legal authority on the meaning of OHADA law, the OHADA system works quite diff erently than its transplanted originator. Much of the OHADA state economies remain informal and thus outside the sphere of OHADA law. Within the sphere of business adjudication, litigants may choose arbitration, and sometimes litigants choose to remain in the national system instead of appealing to the CCJA. Also hindering OHADA is that national supreme courts remain wary about working with the CCJA and many national judges are ignorant of the workings of OHADA. In Europe, it is clear that the EU sets the business law tune, in coordination with member states. But for the above-mentioned reasons there is a real question whether Africa's business aff airs are truly governed by OHADA rules. 
Th e Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Th e Court of Justice of the ECOWAS (ECOWAS CJ) did not start out as an ECJ-style IC. Th e original treaty for the ECOWAS, adopted in 1975, expected that the governing authority would adopt-and member states would then implement-a series of legally binding protocols to promote economic integration. Th e treaty included a provision that contemplated the establishment of a Community Court, but no court was ever created. In the late 1980s, member states began discussing a new charter for ECOWAS, creating an "Eminent Persons Group" to make recommendations. In the meantime, states adopted a Protocol on the Community Court of Justice (the 1991 protocol) 35 that authorized the ECOWAS CJ to hear disputes between member states and suits brought by states on behalf of their citizens. Th e protocol gave 33 Th e reforms created a Council of Ministers, which can adopt and amend Uniform Acts and oversee the operation of the OHADA Secretariat and Court. Th e Permanent Secretariat manages the legal aff airs and accounting, and it works with the Council of Ministers to propose new areas of business law harmonization and to draft new laws.
34 CM Dickerson, "Th e Cameroonian Experience under OHADA: Business Organizations in a Developing Economy" (2007) 112 Bus. & Soc'y Rev. 191. 35 Protocol on the Community Court of Justice A/P.1/7/91 adopted in Abuja, Nigeria on July 6, 1991.
the Secretariat no role in monitoring or helping to enforce community rules, and neither national judges nor private actors were authorized to refer cases to the community court. According to Kufuor, the Eminent Persons Group expressed dissatisfaction with the 1991 protocol, recommending that a revised ECOWAS charter should allow private actors to invoke certain ECOWAS legal rights directly before the ECOWAS CJ. Th ese recommendations were not heeded. 36 Implementing this protocol in 2000, member states made what, in retrospect, was a portentous decision; in their expectation of a major re-launching of regional integration, the protocol made the new court a permanent body.
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It took until 1996 for the requisite number of states to ratify the court protocol, and until 2001 for the fi rst group of judges to be appointed. Th en the fully staff ed ECOWAS CJ sat unused because states never brought any cases. Th e ECOWAS Secretariat grew frustrated that ECOWAS CJ judges consumed signifi cant community expenses without actually contributing to the goals of the community. Th e problem was the court's extremely limited access rules. Member states had borrowed from Europe, but they had added in adaptations to protect national sovereignty. Private litigants could ask their attorney general to bring a case against another member state on their behalf, but one obvious fl aw in the original design was that private actors had no means of fi ling complaints against their own country. A second limitation was that few national justice ministries or attorney generals knew about the ECOWAS legal system and mobilizing them to raise a case on behalf of private actors was as diffi cult as it was unlikely.
In 2003, a case fi nally reached the ECOWAS court. A Nigerian goods trader challenged Nigeria's closing of its border with Benin in clear violation of ECOWAS law. Th e plaintiff asked the ECOWAS CJ to purposively interpret its jurisdiction and access rules to overcome the "absurdity" that expects a state to be both a plaintiff and a defendant when it violates community rules. Th e ECOWAS CJ refused the invitation, sticking to the plain wording of its mandate that only allowed "disputes instituted by member states on behalf of its nationals against another Member State." Th e court recognized that the ECJ had interpreted its mandate expansively "in the interest of justice. " But it also expressed concerns that, because some ECJ decisions had attracted criticism, they did not "want to tow on the same line." 38 Th e ECOWAS CJ then used the dismissal of the suit to lobby for an expansion of its jurisdiction. Judges asked for changes that included bringing the ECOWAS CJ Supplementary Protocol allows national courts to refer cases involving community law to the ECOWAS CJ, but it does not copy the WAEMU provision that requires national courts of last instance to refer such cases. Th e protocol also authorizes the Executive Secretariat to initiate noncompliance suits. But by far the most important revision-borrowed from Europe's human rights system-was the decision to grant the ECOWAS CJ jurisdiction to review complaints from individuals alleging human rights violations.
Why add a human rights jurisdiction, especially if the problem was the under-enforcement of ECOWAS economic rules? We explore this question at length elsewhere. 40 Relevant for this discussion is the desire of political leaders to adopt policies that might give real meaning to the catchphrase of the time-an "ECOWAS of the people. " Human rights activists were frustrated with the highly politicized and slow-moving African Union human rights system. Th ey sought a quicker and more meaningful mechanism to pursue human rights claims. Governments acceded to their request in part to show progress towards addressing some of the concerns and the needs of the people.
I lack space to explain the switch from copying the ECJ to borrowing from the ECtHR. 41 But in many other ways, ECOWAS continues to borrow from Europe. It has transformed its Secretariat into a body more like the European Commission that can propose legislation and hear noncompliance complaints from states and private actors. It has adopted the legislative instruments of Europe including directly applicable community regulations and directives that still require national implementing legislation. But the failure to provide direct private access to challenge violations of economic rules coupled with the decision to allow direct access for violations of human rights rules has made the ECOWAS court more similar in practice to the ECtHR than it is to the ECJ.
My claim is not that governments wanted to import activist and encroaching international judicial models, and I have not really explained the diff usion of the 39 N Nwogu, "Regional Integration as an Instrument of Human Rights: Reconceptualizing ECOWAS" (2007) became more open to regionally-based supranational courts and advocates pushed governments to borrow from Europe as they generated regional courts. European supranational institutions served as models because they are associated with success. Pro-integration advocates recommended European models but local governments oft en preferred to adapt European models for their own specifi c needs and so as to protect national sovereignty. Two of the three cases involved subsequent reforms during which changes were made that brought the IC even closer to the European model. By embracing and later reforming courts, governments could show their commitment to the integration project and the rule of law. In the Andean context, the European model helped to address a concern that national judges might reject Andean decisions. In OHADA, creating regional business law made investing in the region easier for foreigners, and the fact that governments could not change these rules helped to generate legal certainty and arguably diminish incentives for corruption. Allowing domestic judicial decisions to be appealed to a supranational court increased the credibility of promises that national courts would enforce the common business law. In ECOWAS, the ECJ model served as an inspiration to the Eminent Persons Group charged with making recommendations for a new ECOWAS charter; it shaped the arguments and ECOWAS CJ decision-making in the Afolabi case; 42 and it shaped the WAEMU preliminary ruling system that ECOWAS judges wanted to replicate. Th ese three examples all borrowed from Europe. Meanwhile both Mercosur and ASEAN made a diff erent choice. According to people I spoke with, Brazil became concerned when NAFTA was created that the American-dominated system would spread south. Changing the dysfunctional Mercosur dispute settlement system became a priority, but, despite suggestions by smaller powers, Brazil preferred a WTO system. Aft er all, adopting the European model would allow three countries that comprise less than 30 percent of the population and market to outvote the economically dominant regional hegemon.
43 I am not aware of the history of the ASEAN decision, but given Asian countries' aversion to international courts, their adoption of the WTO model is not very surprising. 
Implications for the Study of Today's International Courts
For social scientists, the multiplication of international courts generates both a puzzle and an opportunity. Th e puzzle is why sovereignty-jealous governments suddenly became more willing to submit to compulsory international judicial oversight, and what does this change actually mean in practice? Th is chapter argued that the end of the Cold War created a conjunctural moment where old international political arrangements were disrupted and governments around the world needed to search for new strategies. Americans and Europeans were looking for evidence of economic, democratic, and human rights reforms, and their preferences shaped the policies and strategies of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. Th is changing context combined with growing extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction-by the United States enacting punishments for "unfair trade" and by American and European courts applying global human rights and mass atrocities law-made committing to international judicial oversight for free trade and human rights agreements newly attractive. Local advocates took advantage of governments' new openness, advocating international judicial models that they associated with success. Th e end of the Cold War and the evolution of extraterritorial law enforcement explain both the timing and the fact that most ICs today borrow from European models. While global forces contribute to change, local issues determine how copied models are adapted. Each institution has its own unique history, but one constant is the new reality countries faced in the 1990s. In 1945, governments faced a choice between proposed international courts or no international judicial review of their policies and choices. Today a WTO-violating barrier to trade could well give rise to WTO adjudication regardless of whether there is or is not a functioning regional adjudive system. Th e African Union's human rights system may well be subject to political delays, but any government offi cial who commits human rights violations and then moves abroad may well face prosecution in a foreign court. Omar Al-Bashir may win promises not to be arrested or extradited to Th e Hague, and Bashar Al-Assad may not as of this writing been indicted by the ICC but both these political leaders need to be very selective when it comes to international travel, and they should make sure that they retain political and fi nancial resources to ensure their protection. In other words, ineff ective local of an ECJ-style court might be embraced. Johannes Rühl of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Geneva is working on diff usion of models and Mercosur.
04_9780199660681_c04.indd 87 04_9780199660681_c04.indd 87 12/2/2013 9:33:59 AM 12/2/2013 9:33:59 AM adjudive mechanisms may well give rise to foreign legal enforcement. Th e more extraterritorial enforcement exists, the more attractive local adjudicative strategies become. Th is reality explains why the African Union and the East African Community are today discussing adding a criminal chamber to its regional legal system. Th e reality of European-style ICs spreading around the world is a boon for social scientists because there are now laboratories of experimentation. We can now investigate how context intersects with the design of international judicial institutions to shape international legal and judicial politics. We can study how international courts become authoritative political and legal actors, and why some international courts remain perennially irrelevant. We can study when international judges become activist, and when they remain conservative legal formalists. And we can study the factors that generate opposition to international legal enforcement. Of course, we want to know more about how and why international courts have multiplied in number and replicated in form. But ultimately, we want to know what becomes of these many international judicial transplants.
Research questions
1) How does compulsory jurisdiction aff ect the law and politics of international courts? How does the ability of private actors and/or supranational prosecutors to initiate litigation change the content of international litigation and the legal outputs of international judges? 2) Why do local leaders choose to adapt existing international models, and how are these adaptations important? 3) How does the context shape the operation of similarly designed international judicial institutions? Do variations in legal rules and adjudicative mechanisms across regional systems contribute to changing law and outcomes? 4) Clearly the dynamics of human rights and mass atrocities litigation will be diff erent from enforcing international economic agreements. But how does the content of the law and the nature of the defendant infl uence adjudication politics? Do advocates have diff erent litigation strategies for diff erent countries and diff erent issues? 
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